Strategic Communication Networks

Jeanne Hagenbach () and Frederic Koessler
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Jeanne Hagenbach: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to the individuals who decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information transmission occurring in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network. We provide an explicit link between players' preferences and the equilibrium strategic communication networks. A key feature of our equilibrium characterization is that whether communication takes place between two agents not only depends on the conflict of interest between these agents, but also on the number and preferences of the other agents with whom they communicate. Apart from some specific cases, the equilibrium communication networks are quite complex despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogeneity. In general, strategic communication networks cannot be completely Pareto-ranked, but expected social welfare always increases as the communication network expands.

Keywords: networks; Cheap talk; coordination; incomplete information; information incomplète; Communication gratuite; réseaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00367692v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in 2009

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic Communication Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic communication networks (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic communication networks (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic communication networks (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic communication networks (2008)
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