Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service

Marie Allard, Izabela Jelovac and Pierre-Thomas Léger
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Marie Allard: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal
Pierre-Thomas Léger: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal, CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi

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Abstract: The main question raised in this paper is whether GPs should self select their paymentmechanism or not. To answer it, we model GPs' behavior under the most commonpayment schemes (capitation and fee-for-service) and when GPs can select one amongthose. Our analysis considers GPs heterogeneity in terms of both ability and sense ofprofessional duty. We conclude that when savings on specialists costs are the mainconcern of a regulator, GPs should be paid on a fee-for-service basis. Instead, whenfailures to identify severe conditions are the main concern, then payment self selection byGPs can be optimal.

Keywords: GPs; gatekeeping; payment scheme; self selection; ability; professional duty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00523370v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 2010

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Working Paper: Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00523370

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