Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores

Aymeric Lardon

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Abstract: In this article we study interval games in oligopolies following the γ-approach. First, we analyze their non-cooperative foundation and show that each coalition is associated with an endogenous real interval. Second, the Hurwicz criterion turns out to be a key concept to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of each of the induced core solution concepts: the interval and the standard γ-cores. The first condition permits to ascertain that even for linear and symmetric industries the interval γ-core is empty. Moreover, by means of the approximation technique of quadratic Bézier curves we prove that the second condition always holds, hence the standard γ-core is non-empty, under natural properties of profit and cost functions.

Keywords: Interval game; Oligopoly; γ-Cores; Hurwicz criterion; Quadratic Bézier curve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-29
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00544044v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2016, ⟨10.1007/s10479-016-2211-7⟩

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Journal Article: Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544044

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2211-7

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