Fiscal Federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU: Lessons from a theoretical model

Amélie Barbier-Gauchard ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: What is the optimal wat to stabilize shocks and to take care of fiscal discipline in a fiscal union ? Among the various possible ways, this paper focuses on an inter-countries insurance scheme conditioned by the national preference for the fiscal discipline of each government. We will show that the insurance scheme improves significantly the union\'s social welfare because it enables to cover deviations of the output gap and correct national preferences.

Keywords: Inter-countries insurance; stabilization; fiscal discipline; EU; fiscal federalism; selection adverse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10-25
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00007797
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2005, 5 (11), pp.1-8

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00007797/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU: Lessons from a theoretical model (2005)
Journal Article: Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU: Lessons from a theoretical model (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00007797

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().