Technical Efficiency and Contractual Incentives: the Case of Urban Public Transport in France

William Roy ()
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William Roy: LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies the relative performances of contractual arrangements used in the French local public transport industry. Levels of inefficiency are estimated with a production frontier approach. The results confirm the theoretical properties of incentive contracts that lead to better technical efficiency.

Keywords: Contracts; Contractual Incentives; Contractual arrangements; Efficiency; Performance; Urban Public Transport; Public service governance; France (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00095304
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Published in AET. European Transport Conference 2004 – ETC 2004, 4 - 6 october 2004, Strasbourg, 2004, London, United Kingdom. 11 p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00095304

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