The Core of a coalitional exchange economy

Elena del Mercato

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Abstract: In pure exchange economies, a poor attention has been given to how the individual consumption possibilities of the members of a coalition should be represented. It seems economically reasonable that our knowledge and our possibility to make decisions depend on the coalition we belong to. We define a coalitional exchange economy by considering a pure exchange economy in which the individual consumption sets of consumers within a coalition depend on the membership of the coalition. Our definition includes as a particular case the classical definition of pure exchange economy. We adapt the core concept to a coalitional exchange economy, and we show the non-emptiness of the core. Finally, we discuss more general setting where individual preferences are also depending on the coalitions.

Keywords: consumption possibility; exchange economy; core; Cooperative game; coeur; Jeu coopératif; économie d'échange; possibilité individuelle de consommation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00118765v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2006

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Working Paper: The Core of a coalitional exchange economy (2006)
Working Paper: The core of a coalitional exchange economy (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00118765

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