Publicité limitée de l'information et sur-réaction aux annonces lors des épisodes spéculatifs

Camille Cornand and Frank Heinemann

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The model of Morris and Shin [2002] shows that imprecise public announcements can coordinate the actions of speculators far from the fundamental because of over-reaction to announcements. The strong focal potential of common knowledge is welfare damaging when it induces over-reaction to an imprecise public signal. However, laboratory experiments show that agents over-react to announcements, but not as much as what is theoretically predicted in models based on public information that generates common knowledge. This paper introduces the notion of limited degree of publicity, which seems to render better account for the actual degree of agents' over-reaction.

Keywords: publicité limitée de l'information; sur-réaction; spéculation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00137477
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue Economique, 2006, 57 (3), pp.399-405

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00137477/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Publicité limitée de l'information et sur-réaction aux annonces lors des épisodes spéculatifs (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00137477

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().