Efficiency of Uniform Standards for Transboundary Pollution Problems: a note

Basak Bayramoglu and Jean-François Jacques

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This note proposes an example which contradicts the idea that similar countries will negotiate an agreement on a uniform standard. It shows that strictly identical countries may have an interest in reducing their emissions differently, and not in a uniform way. This result relies on the existence of fixed costs in the abatement technology. Identical countries could be better off by signing an agreement on differentiated standards in order to exploit increasing returns to scale in the abatement activities. More specifically, one of the countries abates for both, and pays for the fixed cost of investment. In return, it is compensated by monetary transfers for this effort. We show that the level of fixed cost must be sufficiently high in this case.

Keywords: Transboundary pollution; cooperative games; bargaining; standards; transfers; fixed cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00159575v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2007

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00159575v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency of Uniform Standards for Transboundary Pollution Problems: a note (2007)
Working Paper: Efficiency of uniform standards for transboundary pollution problems: a note (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00159575

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().