Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study

André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger () and Karine Van der Straeten ()
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André Blais: UdeM - Université de Montréal
Nicolas Sauger: CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too involved, in which case they rely on simple heuristics.

Keywords: voting behavior.; Elections; comportement de vote.; comportement de vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00335046v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study (2008)
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