In Silico Voting Experiments

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically. Different ways of generating random preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.

Keywords: Social; Choice.; Voting; Rules.; Impartial; Culture.; Condorcet.; Borda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00390376
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Chapter: In Silico Voting Experiments (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00390376

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