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Risk aversion and schooling decisions

Christian Belzil and Marco Leonardi

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Abstract: Using unique Italian panel data in which individual differences in attitudes toward risk are measurable (from a lottery pricing question), we investigate the effect of the individual specific time invariant risk aversion factor on the probability of entering higher education. Apart from the risk aversion factor, absolute risk aversion depends on various state variables (wealth, liquidity constraints, back- ground risk) and is assumed to be measured with nonclassical error. We also take into account the endogeneity of the response to the risk aversion question, as well as potential non-classical measurement error in wealth. All model specifications point out to the fact that individual specific risk aversion acts as a deterrent to higher education investment.

Keywords: Risk Aversion; Ex-ante risk; schooling; subjective beliefs; dynamic discrete choices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08-26
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00411099v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Risk Aversion and Schooling Decisions (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Risk Aversion and Schooling Decisions (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Risk Aversion and Schooling Decisions (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Risk Aversion and Schooling Decisions (2007) Downloads
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