Irreversible Games with Incomplete Information: The Asymptotic Value

Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: Irreversible games are stochastic games in which once the play leaves a state it never revisits that state. This class includes absorbing games. This paper proves the existence and a characterization of the asymptotic value for any finite irreversible game with incomplete information on both sides. This result extends Mertens and Zamir 1971 for repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, and Rosenberg 2000 for absorbing games with incomplete information on one side.

Keywords: Stochastic games; repeated game; incomplete information; asymptotic value; comparison principle; variational inequalities; Jeux stochastiques; jeux répétés; information incomplète; valeur asymptotique; principe de comparaison; inégalités variationelles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04-06
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