Judge:Don't Vote!

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.

Keywords: Voting; Strategic manipulation; Social choice; Skating; Majority judgment; Condorcet's paradox; Arrow's paradox; Jugement majoritaire; Manipulation stratégique; Vote; Choix social; Patinage artistique; Paradoxe de Condorcet; Paradoxe d'Arrow (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-18
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00536968v1
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Journal Article: Judge: Don't Vote ! (2014)
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