Price Discrimination and Customer Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from Marseille

Alan Kirman, Sonia Moulet () and Rainer Schulz ()
Additional contact information
Rainer Schulz: Business School Aberdeen - University of Aberdeen

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We analyse the interaction between a seller and customers in a shop on the fruits and vegetables wholesale market in Marseille using an unique data set. We find that customers' bargaining activity is correlated with the kind and location of the business. To determine how the interactions between the seller and the customers influence prices, we compare the price each customer pays for a given good with the daily average price. We find that a customer of the shop is more likely to pay a price higher than other customers for the same good if---ceteris paribus---the customer is unknown to the shop assistants, buys only a small quantity, or buys goods sold on commission. If the customer is known to the shop assistants, then loyalty and bargaining make it more likely that the customer gets better than average price.

Keywords: Face-to-face bargaining; customer loyalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-22
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00349036v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00349036v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00349036

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().