ENDOGENOUS EFFORTS ON NETWORKS: DOES CENTRALITY MATTER ?

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents provide more efforts for general payofffunctions, and we fully characterize equilibria under geometric decay.

Keywords: Communication Network; Endogenous Efforts; Strategic Complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-16
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00353872v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00353872v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00353872

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().