Toward waste management contracts

Stéphanie Lemaitre and Hubert Stahn
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Stéphanie Lemaitre: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper deals with the cost of treatment of the ultimate waste, that is waste which cannot, in the absence of recycling opportunities, be reduced by a suitable taxation scheme. We propose a new way to handle this waste based on aWaste Management Contracts (WMC) which largely implicates the households in the cost reduction process. Within a set of feasible, i.e. budget balancing, incentive compatible and acceptable, contracts we characterize the optimal WMC and compare this system to a more standard one based on an Advanced and a Disposal Fee

Keywords: Waste Management; Disposal Fee Policy; Household Effort; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-23
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00449538
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Related works:
Working Paper: Toward Waste Management Contracts (2014)
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