Winners and losers of early elections: On the welfare implications of political blockades and early elections

Felix Bierbrauer and Lydia Mechtenberg

No 2008-071, SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk

Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome a blockade. They have the advantage that urgent decisions are no longer delayed, and the disadvantage that unsuccessful governments gain additional time in office. This may give rise to a time inconsistency. Voters are in favour of a constitution without early elections. However, in the middle of a political crisis, they are willing to abandon it.

Keywords: Early elections; political blockades; ideological rigidities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Winners and Losers of Early Elections: On the Welfare Implications of Political Blockades and Early Elections (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2008-071

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