A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

Lydia Mechtenberg and Johannes Münster

No 2011-012, SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk

Abstract: This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication.

Keywords: communication; information; cheap talk; mediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Journal Article: A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission (2012)
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