Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?

Amedeo Piolatto

No 2009/27, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: This study compares the representativeness of voters in the proportional electoral system with the situation under plurality rule. Representativeness is commonly measured by comparing parties’ received votes with their shares of seats in the Parliament; this implies that proportional rule should always better represent voters. A coalition within the Parliament, however, rules the country without interference and supports the government; when a coalition is formed, the pivotal role of small parties and the proposal right of the formateur can significantly impact the distribution of power. Focusing on the coalition formation stage, I demonstrate that the proportional rule is more representative only under very specific conditions. If these conditions are not met, introducing some distortions in the distribution of seats among parties can actually improve representativeness.

Keywords: Electoral systems; proportional rule; plurality rule; voters’ representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H1 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2009-IEB-WorkingPaper-27.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters? (2011)
Working Paper: Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness (2009)
Working Paper: Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-27

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().