Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count

Orestis Troumpounis (orestis.troumpounis@uab.cat)
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Orestis Troumpounis: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

No 2009/30, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: I consider a two-party parliamentary election where parties compete on a quality (or valence) dimension. First I motivate why in such an election a voter may decide to cast a blank vote. Second I define a new voting system, inspired in the standard proportional representation system, where the percentage of blank votes is translated into vacant seats in the parliament. I analyze party competition assuming adapted versions of the models of “Bertand” and “Cournot”. I compare the equilibrium outcomes on parties’ quality and profits obtained with both the alternative proportional system and the standard one. I show that society and parties may have interests in conflict.

Keywords: electoral systems; blank voting; proportional representation systems; endogenous valence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2009
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