Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

Jon Fiva and Gisle Natvik

No 2009/36, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers’ re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects their investments in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital.

Keywords: Political economics; strategic capital accumulation; identifying popularity shocks. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H40 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do re-election probabilities influence public investment? (2013)
Working Paper: Do re-election probabilities influence public investment? (2010)
Working Paper: Do re-election probabilities influence public investment? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-36

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