Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects

Mario Jametti () and Marcelin Joanis

No 2010/7, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the underlying causes of expenditure decentralization, based on the predictions of a new political economy model of partial fiscal decentralization. Under shared expenditure responsibility, the degree of decentralization is endogenous and depends on the relative political conditions prevailing at each level of government. Our empirical results from a panel of democracies support the relevance of political factors as determinants of fiscal decentralization. The relationship between central government electoral strength and both expenditure and revenue centralization emerges as nontrivial and non-linear. Political forces at the central government level driving centralization up and down appear to coexist.

Keywords: fiscal decentralization; fiscal federalism; vertical interactions; partial decentralization; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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