Do governments tax agglomeration rents?
Hyun-Ju Koh () and
Nadine Riedel
Additional contact information
Hyun-Ju Koh: University of Munich
Nadine Riedel: Oxford University CBT & CESifo Munich
No 2010/21, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)
Abstract:
Using the German local business tax as a testing ground, we empirically investigate the impact of firm agglomeration on municipal tax setting behavior. The analysis exploits a rich data source on the population of German firms to construct detailed measures for the communities' agglomeration characteristics. The findings indicate that urbanization and localization economies exert a positive impact on the jurisdictional tax rate choice which confirms predictions of the theoretical New Economic Geography (NEG) literature. Further analysis suggests a qualification of the NEG argument by showing that a municipality's potential to tax agglomeration rents depends on its firm and industry agglomeration relative to neighboring communities. To account for potential endogeneity problems, our analysis exploits long-lagged population and infrastructure variables as instruments for the agglomeration measures.
Keywords: Agglomeration rents; corporate taxation; regional differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H73 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
http://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2010-IEB-WorkingPaper-21.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2010-21
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().