Media competition and electoral politics

Amedeo Piolatto and Florian Schuett

No 2014/14, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates' ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. While information pushes up independent turnout, partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate, and on average they vote less when informed.

Keywords: Demand for news; electoral turnout; group-rule utilitarianism; media bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Media competition and electoral politics (2015)
Working Paper: Media competition and electoral politics (2014)
Working Paper: Media Competition and Electoral Politics (2013)
Working Paper: Media Competition and Electoral Politics (2013)
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