Political corruption and voter turnout: mobilization or disaffection?

Elena Costas-Pérez ()
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Elena Costas-Pérez: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB

No 2014/27, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: Corruption may affect voter turnout either by mobilizing citizens to go to the polls or by promoting voter disaffection. Using Spanish local and survey data, we study whether these effects depend on partisan leanings or the timing of scandals. Our results show that repeated episodes of corruption increase the boost abstentionism. Independent voters – those with no political attachments – are the only group that that abstains in response to corruption. The incumbent’s core supporters fail to recognise corruption within their party, while both independent voters and the opposition’s core supporters report higher corruption perceptions in response to a scandal.

Keywords: Electoral turnout; accountability; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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