EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Unordnung in der Internationalen Handelsordnung: Befunde, Gründe, Auswirkungen und Therapien

Rolf Langhammer

No 1533, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: In the past, many WTO member states have liberalized their trade policies unilaterally. However, they were decreasingly prepared to guarantee these measures multilaterally, that is to bind them. This paper analyzes the background of this development by resorting to three political economy arguments pro multilateral binding: the terms of trade externality argument, the tying hand argument, that is to protect a government which is prone to liberalize against domestic lobby groups, and finally the argument that trade policies are instruments for general political targets. For all three arguments, it is shown why an important driving force of mercantilistically motivated trade negotiations has become weaker, the reciprocity requirement. The paper recommends narrower negotiation issues and mandates to prevent a further rising heterogeneity of issues and negotiation partners.

Keywords: International Trading Order; Multilateral Trading Negotiations; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/28366/1/607967536.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unordnung in der internationalen Handelsordnung: Befunde, Gründe, Auswirkungen und Therapien (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1533

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1533