Deterrence works for criminals

Menusch Khadjavi

No 1938, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker's deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals.

Keywords: Crime; Stealing; Deterrence; Prison; Extra-laboratory experiment; Artefactual field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C93 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deterrence works for criminals (2018)
Working Paper: Deterrence Works for Criminals (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1938

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