Setting the bar - An experimental investigation of immigration requirements

Menusch Khadjavi and Jasper D. Tjaden

No 1939, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Many Western countries face the challenge of reconciling future labor demand with growing public opposition to immigration. The dynamics and underlying processes of setting immigration requirements remain unclear as research so far mainly focuses on context-specific empirical studies. We use a public good game experiment with endogenous groups to investigate how different levels of perceived migrant potential and public debate shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. Our results suggest that fairness and efficiency of immigration requirements may best be described by the relationship between average population indicators and required contributions of immigrants. Public debate appears to foster fair and efficient requirements if perceived migrant potential is high.

Keywords: Immigration; Public Good; Endogenous Groups; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H41 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Journal Article: Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements (2018)
Working Paper: Setting the Bar - An Experimental Investigation of Immigration Requirements (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1939

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