The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox
Wolfgang Eggert and
Martin Kolmar
No 03/07, CoFE Discussion Papers from University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)
Abstract:
This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimaltaxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the previous literature that integration of international capital markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, different to the existing literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public-good provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.
Keywords: tax competition; information exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F20 F42 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23558/1/dp03_07.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax‐competition Paradox (2004) 
Working Paper: The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cofedp:0307
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