Does the Nomination Scheme of the City Manager Matter for Urban Development Policies?

Sebastian Garmann

No 476, Ruhr Economic Papers from RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen

Abstract: This paper examines the causal effect of a change in the nomination scheme of the city manager from appointment by the local council to election by the citizens on urban development policies. Using the fact that the timing of the reform was as good as random in municipalities of the German state Hesse, I can utilize a difference-in-difference framework to estimate this causal effect. I find that when the city manager is elected by the voters, there is significantly less urban development than when the city manager is appointed by the municipal council.

Keywords: urban development policies; form of local government; land use regulations; building licenses; difference-in-difference estimation; natural experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 Q15 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/95239/1/781818818.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:rwirep:476

DOI: 10.4419/86788539

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Ruhr Economic Papers from RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().