Explaining Differentials in Subsidy Levels among Hospital Ownership Types in Germany

Adam Pilny

No 517, Ruhr Economic Papers from RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen

Abstract: German hospitals receive subsidies for investment costs by federal states. Theoretically, these subsidies have to cover the whole investment volume, but in fact only 50%-60% are covered. Balance sheet data show that public hospitals exhibit higher levels of subsidies compared to for-profit hospitals. In this study, I examine the sources of this disparity by decomposing the differential in a so-called facilitation ratio, i.e. the ratio of subsidies to tangible fixed assets, revealing to which extent assets are funded by subsidies. The question of interest is, whether the differential can be attributed to observable hospital-specific and federal state-specific characteristics or unobservable factors.

Keywords: hospitals; subsidies; ownership; Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 I11 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Journal Article: Explaining Differentials in Subsidy Levels Among Hospital Ownership Types in Germany (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:rwirep:517

DOI: 10.4419/86788592

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