Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching

Emeric Henry and Charles Louis-Sidois ()
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Charles Louis-Sidois: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim

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Abstract: Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.

Keywords: Image concern; Voting; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393121v1
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Working Paper: Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching (2018)
Working Paper: Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpspec:hal-03393121

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