Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law

Galbiati, Roberto; Henry, Emeric; Jacquemet, Nicolas

Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law

Roberto Galbiati, Emeric Henry and Nicolas Jacquemet ()

Abstract: How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

Keywords: Enforcement; Social values; Cooperation; Learning; Spillovers; Persistence of institutions; Repeated games; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393094v2
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpspec:hal-03393094

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