Credibility and Monetary Policy

Jean Barthélemy and Eric Mengus

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Abstract: This paper revisits the ability of central banks to manage private sector's expectations depending on its credibility and how this affects the use of interest rate rules and pegs to achieve monetary policy objectives. When private agents can only provide limited incentives for the central bank to follow a policy, we show that resulting limited credibility allows a central bank to prevents the inflation from diverging by defaulting on past promises if necessary. As a result, the Taylor rule, when expected, anchors inflation expectations on a unique equilibrium path as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied. Finally, we also show that limited credibility restricts the impact of long-term interest rate pegs, so as to make current conditions less dependent on future policy changes.

Date: 2017-02-01
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Working Paper: Credibility and Monetary Policy (2017)
Working Paper: Credibility and Monetary Policy (2017)
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