Waiting for my Neighbors

Sidartha Gordon (), Emeric Henry and Pauli Murto
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Sidartha Gordon: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Pauli Murto: Aalto University

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Abstract: We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases each time a neighbor stops. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network depends on initial parameters and can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players stop first. We find that, in addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to two other inefficiencies, the first linked to the order of exit and the second to the final distribution of remaining nodes.

Keywords: Waiting games; Networks; Inefficiencies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393125v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Waiting for my neighbors (2021)
Working Paper: Waiting for My Neighbors (2021)
Working Paper: Waiting for My Neighbors (2021)
Working Paper: Waiting for my neighbors (2018)
Working Paper: Waiting for my Neighbors (2018)
Working Paper: Waiting for my Neighbors (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03393125

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