When in Rome… on local norms and sentencing decisions
David Abrams,
Roberto Galbiati,
Emeric Henry and
Arnaud Philippe
Additional contact information
David Abrams: University of Pennsylvania
Arnaud Philippe: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Abstract:
In this paper, we show that sentencing norms vary widely even across geographically close units. By examining North Carolina's unique judicial rotation system, we show that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge to local sentencing norms. We document factors that facilitate this convergence and show that sentencing norms are predicted by preferences of the local constituents. We build on these empirical results to analyze theoretically the delegation trade-off faced by a social planner: the judge can learn the local norm, but only at the cost of potential capture.
Keywords: Justice; Sentences; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393093v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393093v1/document (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: When in Rome… on local norms and sentencing decisions (2019) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03393093
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().