The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly

Gerard Mondello and Evens Salies

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Abstract: Summary:Thispaper extends thebasicunilateralaccidentmodel toallow forCournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variablesunderasymmetriccapacityconstraints. We find thatliabilityregimesexerta crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output andhigher riskcomparedto negligence. Wealsostudytheconditionsunderwhich bothregimes converge. KeyWords:TortLaw,Strict

Keywords: Tort Law; Strict liability; Negligence Rule; Imperfect competition; Oligopoly; Cournot competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly (2021)
Working Paper: The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly (2018)
Working Paper: The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly (2018)
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