Market microstructure, information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game

Edouard Challe and Edouard Chrétien

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: Speculators contemplating an attack (e.g., on a currency peg) must guess the beliefs of other speculators, which they can do by looking at the stock market. As shown in earlier work, this information-gathering process may be destabilising by creating multiple equilibria. This paper studies the role played by the microstructure of the asset market in the emergence of multiple equilibria driven by information aggregation. To do so, we study the outcome of a two-stage global game wherein an asset price determined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous public signal about the fundamental that affects traders' decision to attack in the coordination stage of the game. In the trading stage, placing a full demand schedule (i.e., a continuum of limit orders) is costly, but traders may use riskier (and cheaper) market orders, i.e., order to sell or buy a fixed quantity of assets unconditional on the execution price. Price execution risk reduces traders aggressiveness and hence slows down information aggregation, which ultimately makes multiple equilibria in the coordination stage less likely. In this sense, microstructure frictions that lead to greater individual exposure (to price execution risk) may reduce aggregate uncertainty (by pinning down a unique equilibrium outcome).

Keywords: Market microstructure; Information aggregation; Global game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03440891v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in European Economic Review, 2018, 102, pp.82 - 99. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.004⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03440891v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market microstructure, information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game (2018)
Working Paper: Market microstructure, information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game (2018)
Working Paper: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE, INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS IN A GLOBAL GAME (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03440891

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().