An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Alfred Galichon (), Scott Kominers and Simon Weber
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Alfred Galichon: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Simon Weber: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We characterize equilibrium and conditions for identification, and derive comparative statics.

Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Becker-Coase Theorem; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03460155
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Working Paper: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility (2014)
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