One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

Quoc-Anh Do, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and Anh Tran
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Kieu-Trang Nguyen: LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science
Anh Tran: Indiana University - Indiana University [Bloomington] - Indiana University System

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Abstract: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Keywords: patronage politics; Vietnam; hometown (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03391952v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Published in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2017, 9 (4), pp.1 - 29. ⟨10.1257/app.20130472⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03391952

DOI: 10.1257/app.20130472

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