The Signaling Effect of Raising Inflation

Jean Barthélemy and Eric Mengus

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: This paper argues that central bankers should raise inflation when anticipating liquidity traps to signal their credibility to forward guidance policies. As stable inflation in normal times either stems from central banker's credibility, e.g. through reputation, or from his aversion to inflation, the private sector is unable to infer the central banker's type from observing stable inflation, jeopardizing the efficiency of forward guidance policy. We show that this signaling motive can justify level of inflation well above 2% but also that the low inflation volatility during the Great Moderation was insufficient to ensure fully efficient forward guidance when needed.

Keywords: Forward guidance; Inflation; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03471880
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03471880/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The signaling effect of raising inflation (2018)
Working Paper: The Signaling Effect of Raising Inflation (2017)
Working Paper: The Signaling Effect of Raising Inflation (2016)
Working Paper: The Signaling Effect of Raising Inflation (2016)
Working Paper: The Signaling Effect of Raising Inflation (2016)
Working Paper: The signaling effect of raising inflation (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03471880

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().