Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure

Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani

No wp-2016-65, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to assess the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may level the playing field between applicants who differ in their cognitive ability. We test this conjecture experimentally for the widely used Boston mechanism.

Keywords: Education; Experimental design; Organizational behavior; Strategic planning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-65.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through Information Disclosure (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2016-65

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Siméon Rapin ().