Household bargaining and spending on children: Experimental evidence from Tanzania

Charlotte Ringdal and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen

No wp-2017-128, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper studies whether increasing the wife's bargaining power results in couples allocating more resources to their child, and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms for this are. We conduct a novel between-subject lab experiment in Tanzania, in which we vary the relative bargaining power between spouses. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife's bargaining power does not result in an increase in the allocation to the child, but it does lead to equal allocations to boys and girls.

Keywords: Intra-household allocation; Female bargaining power; Tanzania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania (2021)
Working Paper: Household bargaining and spending on children: Experimental evidence from Tanzania (2017)
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