How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour?: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania

Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig

No wp-2018-11, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Does self-serving elite behaviour make citizens more politically active? This paper presents the results of a randomized field experiment where voters in Tanzania were given information about elite use of tax havens. Information provided in a neutral form had no effect on voting intentions. Information phrased in more morally charged terms led to a reduction in voting intentions. Additional evidence suggests that rather than increase the perceived importance of voting, charged information tends to undermine confidence in political institutions and the social contract.

Keywords: Elites; Citizens; Voter turnout; Political participation; Tax havens; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2018-11

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