Monetary union and the Maastricht inflation criterion: The accession countries

Gulcin Ozkan, Anne Sibert and Alan Sutherland ()

The Economics of Transition, 2004, vol. 12, issue 4, 635-652

Abstract: We model an accession country facing a Maastricht‐type inflation criterion that specifies an inflation ceiling. In addition to deciding whether or not to satisfy this criterion, the country must decide how much costly economic reform to undertake. If the country puts enough weight on the future that it can credibly meet the inflation criterion no matter what the ceiling is, then the inflation criterion benefits the country but lowers reform. If the country puts less weight on the future, then a criterion with a properly chosen inflation ceiling can increase reform. We derive the inflation ceilings that maximize the country's welfare and its reform.

Date: 2004
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