Maximum-revenue versus Optimum-welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game
Roger Clarke and
Review of International Economics, 2008, vol. 16, issue 5, 919-929
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986 ) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximize tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximize tax revenue is not a Nash equilibrium unless the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently high. For a wide range of values for the degree of product substitutability, the game is a prisoner's dilemma where both countries are better off delegating to policymakers who maximize tax revenue but both will delegate to policymakers who maximize welfare in the Nash equilibrium. Copyright © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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