Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
George Mailath () and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rafael Robb
Econometrica, 1993, vol. 61, issue 1, pages 29-56
An evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with stochastic mutations is analyzed. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked to their current relative success, but mutuation, perturbing the system from its deterministic evolution, are present as well. The focus is on the long run implications of ongoing mutations, which drastically reduce the set of equilibria. For 2 by 2 symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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Working Paper: Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games (1999)
Working Paper: Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games (1991)
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