The Evolution of Conventions
H. Young ()
Econometrica, 1993, vol. 61, issue 1, pages 57-84
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (732) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%2819930 ... O%3B2-W&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:1:p:57-84
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues
Access Statistics for this article
Econometrica is currently edited by Daron Acemoglu
More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().