Anna Gelpern and
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2013, vol. 41, issue 2, 367-385
The Greek debt crisis prompted EU officials to embark on a radical reconstruction of the European sovereign debt markets. Prominently featured in this reconstruction was a set of contract provisions called Collective Action Clauses, or CACs. CACs are supposed to help governments and private creditors to renegotiate unsustainable debt contracts, and obviate the need for EU bailouts. But European sovereign debt contacts were already amenable to restructuring; adding CACs could make it harder. Why, then, promote CACs at all, and cast them in such a central role in the market reform initiative? Using interviews with participants in the initiative and those affected by it, as well as observations at policy and academic meetings, we attempt to shed light on the puzzle and draw implications for the role of contract techniques in market construction.
Keywords: Legal theory of finance; Eurozone; Sovereign debt; Collective action clauses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F55 G15 G20 G28 H63 H81 K2 N20 P16 P43 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:367-385
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Comparative Economics is currently edited by D. Berkowitz and G. Roland
More articles in Journal of Comparative Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().