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Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2015

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Zhang, Lei ().

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Volume 157, issue C, 2015

A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems pp. 1-27 Downloads
Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa
Public information in Markov games pp. 28-48 Downloads
Andrew Kloosterman
Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information pp. 49-75 Downloads
Qingmin Liu
Minimum cost connection networks: Truth-telling and implementation pp. 76-99 Downloads
Jens Leth Hougaard and Mich Tvede
Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games pp. 100-127 Downloads
Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi
Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring pp. 128-145 Downloads
Yves Guéron
Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects pp. 146-171 Downloads
Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato
Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution pp. 172-187 Downloads
Jonathan Newton and Simon Angus
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring pp. 188-211 Downloads
Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang
Key leaders in social networks pp. 212-235 Downloads
Junjie Zhou and Ying-Ju Chen
Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities pp. 236-254 Downloads
Peter Borm, Yuan Ju and David Wettstein
Innovation by entrants and incumbents pp. 255-294 Downloads
Daron Acemoglu and Dan Cao
Matching markets under (in)complete information pp. 295-314 Downloads
Lars Ehlers and Jordi Massó
Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets pp. 315-348 Downloads
Francesco Nava
Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains pp. 349-383 Downloads
Alexander Reffgen
The value of information under unawareness pp. 384-396 Downloads
Spyros Galanis
Unemployment risk and wage differentials pp. 397-424 Downloads
Roberto Pinheiro and Ludo Visschers
Approachability with delayed information pp. 425-444 Downloads
David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer
History-dependent risk attitude pp. 445-477 Downloads
David Dillenberger and Kareen Rozen
Breakdown in multilateral negotiations pp. 478-484 Downloads
Daniel Göller and Michael Hewer
Optimal central bank lending pp. 485-516 Downloads
Andreas Schabert
Product line design pp. 517-526 Downloads
Simon P. Anderson and Levent Celik
On the private provision of public goods on networks pp. 527-552 Downloads
Nizar Allouch
Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring pp. 553-605 Downloads
Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci
Decreasing aversion under ambiguity pp. 606-623 Downloads
Frédéric Cherbonnier and Christian Gollier
On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory pp. 624-647 Downloads
Geoffroy de Clippel
Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals pp. 648-667 Downloads
Simone Galperti
Knowledge spillovers in cities: An auction approach pp. 668-698 Downloads
Victor Couture
Variational Bewley preferences pp. 699-729 Downloads
José Heleno Faro
Put–Call Parity and market frictions pp. 730-762 Downloads
S. Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni and M. Marinacci
Banking bubbles and financial crises pp. 763-792 Downloads
Jianjun Miao and Pengfei Wang
Intertemporal coordination with delay options pp. 793-810 Downloads
Luis Araujo and Bernardo Guimaraes
Blockbusting: Brokers and the dynamics of segregation pp. 811-841 Downloads
Amine Ouazad
Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors pp. 842-878 Downloads
Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel
Exchangeable capacities, parameters and incomplete theories pp. 879-917 Downloads
Larry G. Epstein and Kyoungwon Seo
An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values pp. 918-958 Downloads
Dieter Balkenborg and Miltiadis Makris
On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly pp. 959-972 Downloads
David McAdams
Optimal entry timing pp. 973-1000 Downloads
Aaron M. Kolb
On the Mitra–Wan forest management problem in continuous time pp. 1001-1040 Downloads
Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian and Giuseppe Freni
Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players pp. 1041-1055 Downloads
Joyee Deb and Ehud Kalai
Indeterminacy and sunspots in two-sector RBC models with generalized no-income-effect preferences pp. 1056-1080 Downloads
Frédéric Dufourt, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti
The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller pp. 1081-1113 Downloads
Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller and Jürg Müller
Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market pp. 1114-1129 Downloads
Rodrigo A. Velez
Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics pp. 1130-1158 Downloads
Julien Hugonnier, Semyon Malamud and Erwan Morellec
Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation pp. 1159-1187 Downloads
Robert Evans and Sönje Reiche

Volume 156, issue C, 2015

Introduction to computer science and economic theory pp. 1-13 Downloads
Lawrence Blume, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Éva Tardos
Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts pp. 14-44 Downloads
Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items pp. 45-76 Downloads
Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan
Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs pp. 77-102 Downloads
Jing Chen and Silvio Micali
Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design pp. 103-143 Downloads
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline and Qiqi Yan
Pricing lotteries pp. 144-174 Downloads
Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg
Multilateral matching pp. 175-206 Downloads
John William Hatfield and Scott Kominers
Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games pp. 207-245 Downloads
Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos H. Papadimitriou
Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation pp. 246-268 Downloads
Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass
Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure pp. 269-316 Downloads
Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games pp. 317-342 Downloads
Tim Roughgarden and Florian Schoppmann
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions pp. 343-388 Downloads
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme and Éva Tardos
An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms pp. 389-416 Downloads
Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, Yoav Shoham and David M. Pennock
Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks pp. 417-454 Downloads
Mohsen Bayati, Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Yash Kanoria and Andrea Montanari
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