Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2013

Edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

from Elsevier
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Volume 148, issue 3, 2013

Abstention, ideology and information acquisition pp. 871-902

Santiago Oliveros

The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion pp. 903-934

Pietro Ortoleva

The value of switching costs pp. 935-952

Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer and Gergely Dobos

A folk theorem for competing mechanisms pp. 953-973

Michael Peters and Cristián Troncoso-Valverde

Ambiguity and robust statistics pp. 974-1049

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio

On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions pp. 1050-1073

Shurojit Chatterji, Remzi Sanver and Arunava Sen

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains pp. 1074-1101

Juan Carlos Carbajal, Andrew McLennan and Rabee Tourky

Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms pp. 1102-1121

Yves Sprumont

Large games with a bio-social typology pp. 1122-1149

M. Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun and Haomiao Yu

TFP during a credit crunch pp. 1150-1178

Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau

Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market pp. 1179-1212

James J. Anton and Gary Biglaiser

Information acquisition during a Dutch auction pp. 1213-1225

Paavo Miettinen

Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values pp. 1226-1236

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents pp. 1237-1254

Takeshi Momi

On multivariate prudence pp. 1255-1267

Elyès Jouini, Clotilde Napp and Diego Nocetti

Directed search and job rotation pp. 1268-1281

Fei Li and Can Tian

Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market pp. 1282-1291

Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

Why do I like people like me? pp. 1292-1299

Manuel Bagues and Maria J. Perez-Villadoniga

Volume 148, issue 2, 2013

Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine pp. 424-447

Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

A more general theory of commodity bundling pp. 448-472

Mark Armstrong

Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design pp. 473-501

Zvika Neeman and Gregory Pavlov

Dynamic sender–receiver games pp. 502-534

Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Egalitarianism under earmark constraints pp. 535-562

Olivier Bochet, Rahmi İlkılıç and Hervé Moulin

Consumption and bubbles pp. 563-600

Mark Loewenstein and Gregory A. Willard

Goal-setting and self-control pp. 601-626

Alice Hsiaw

Coalitional manipulation on networks pp. 627-662

Biung-Ghi Ju

Aggregating sets of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities pp. 663-688

Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos and Jean-Marc Tallon

Finite-order type spaces and applications pp. 689-719

Cheng-Zhong Qin and Chun-Lei Yang

Linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers pp. 720-742

Monisankar Bishnu

Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games pp. 743-777

Daniel Friedman and Daniel N. Ostrov

Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market pp. 778-792

Colin Decker, Elliott H. Lieb, Robert J. McCann and Benjamin K. Stephens

Many-valued judgment aggregation: Characterizing the possibility/impossibility boundary pp. 793-805

Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins

Endogenous credit limits with small default costs pp. 806-824

Costas Azariadis and Leo Kaas

No-regret dynamics and fictitious play pp. 825-842

Yannick Viossat and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

A two-sector model of endogenous growth with leisure externalities pp. 843-857

Costas Azariadis, Been-Lon Chen, Chia-Hui Lu and Yin-Chi Wang

Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes pp. 858-870

Hitoshi Matsushima

Volume 148, issue 1, 2013

Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting pp. 2-30

Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan

Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts pp. 31-63

John B. Donaldson, Natalia Gershun and Marc P. Giannoni

Social networks and unraveling in labor markets pp. 64-103

Itay P. Fainmesser

Mechanism design without revenue equivalence pp. 104-133

Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey C. Ely

Extremal incentive compatible transfers pp. 134-164

Nenad Kos and Matthias Messner

When are signals complements or substitutes? pp. 165-195

Tilman Matthias Börgers, Angel Hernando-Veciana and Daniel Krähmer

Learning and risk aversion pp. 196-225

Carlos Oyarzun and Rajiv Sarin

Hidden symmetries and focal points pp. 226-258

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Christoph Kuzmics

A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one pp. 259-278

Shin Sato

Smallness of a commodity and partial equilibrium analysis pp. 279-305

Takashi Hayashi

Safety first consumption pp. 306-321

Michael Sattinger

Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality pp. 322-352

Kenichi Ueda

Inequality, mobility and redistributive politics pp. 353-375

Ryo Arawatari and Tetsuo Ono

A two-sided reputation result with long-run players pp. 376-392

Alp E. Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs pp. 393-408

Jingfeng Lu and Lixin Ye

Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships pp. 409-417

Heiner Schumacher